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The Resource Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty : an intelligent agents' perspective, Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung, (electronic book)

Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty : an intelligent agents' perspective, Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung, (electronic book)

Label
Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty : an intelligent agents' perspective
Title
Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty
Title remainder
an intelligent agents' perspective
Statement of responsibility
Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty An Intelligent Agents' Perspective discusses coalition stability. It extends the classic stability concept of the non-transferable utility core by proposing new belief-based stability criteria under uncertainty, and illustrates how the new concept can be used to analyze the stability of a new type of belief-based coalition formation game. The book is intended for graduate students, engineers, and researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and computer science. Chi-kong Chan is a laboratory manager and a visiting lecturer at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China; Ho-fung Leung is a Professor and the Chairman of Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, China
Member of
Cataloging source
EBLCP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Chan, Chi-kong
Dewey number
006.3
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
QA76.76.I58
LC item number
C44 2013
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Leung, Ho-Fung
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Multiagent systems
  • Coalitions
  • Game theory
Label
Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty : an intelligent agents' perspective, Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung, (electronic book)
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Chapter 1. Multi-agent cooperation and stability. 1.1. Semi-competitive multi-agent systems ; 1.1.1. Characteristics of multi-agent systems ; 1.1.2. Two basic solution concepts of coalition formations ; 1.1.2.1. Social utility ; 1.1.2.2. Pareto optimality ; 1.1.2.3. Drawbacks of social utility and Pareto optimality ; 1.2. Coalition formation and game theory ; 1.2.1. Transferable utility games ; 1.2.2. Non transferable utility games ; 1.3. Problem with the common knowledge assumption ; References -- Chapter 2. Non-transferable utility games and coalition formation mechanisms. 2.1. Non-transferable utility cooperative games ; 2.2. Transferable utility cooperative games ; 2.3. Coalition formation mechanisms ; 2.4. Belief and uncertainties ; References -- Chapter 3. Two classes of stability--strong core and weak core ; 3.1. Coalition formation and stability ; 3.2. An example ; 3.3. NTU games with internal uncertainty ; 3.4. Opinions and preferences of agents ; 3.5. The strong core and the weak core ; 3.6. Effect of refinedness of agent opinion ; 3.7. Application areas ; 3.8. Summary ; References -- Chapter 4. The b-core: belief-based coalition stability. 4.1. Games without common knowledge ; 4.2. Belief-based coalitional games ; 4.3. NTU games with private beliefs ; 4.4. The core, the b-core and belief accuracy ; 4.6. On dynamic beliefs ; 4.7. Summary ; References -- Chapter 5. Example application of the b-core: buyer coalition problem with beliefs. 5.1. Buyer coalition problems ; 5.1.1. Are the utility really transferable? ; 5.1.2. How about stability? ; 5.1.3. Private information in buyer coalition ; 5.1.4. Existing approaches ; 5.1.5. A new approach ; 5.2. Background of buyer coalition problem ; 5.2.1. Unit price schedule and agent preference ; 5.2.1.1. Two assumptions ; 5.2.1.2. Bids and agents' preferences ; 5.2.2. Agent beliefs ; 5.2.3. NTU buyer coalition games ; 5.2.4. Properties of the b-core in NTU-buyer games ; 5.2.5. On mechanism design ; 5.3. A distributed mechanism ; 5.3.1. Distributed non-transferable utility coalition formation mechanism ; 5.3.2. An example of the mechanism ; 5.4. Experiment ; 5.4.1. Performance of the mechanism ; 5.4.2. Evidence of incentive compatibility ; 5.5. Summary ; References -- Chapter 6. The complete picture: sb-core and wb-core. 6.1. Uncertain opinion and private beliefs ; 6.2. An illustrating example ; 6.3. NTU-BU games ; 6.3.1. Preferences and beliefs in NTU-BU games ; 6.3.2. NTU-BU games stability ; 6.3.2.1. Objections in NTU-BU games ; 6.3.2.2. wb-core and sb-cores ; 6.4. Properties ; 6.4.1. Relationships of the four criteria ; 6.4.2. Effect of refinedness ; 6.4.3. Effect of accuracy ; 6.5. Summary ; References -- Chapter 7. Conclusion. 7.1. New solution concepts for belief-based NTU games ; 7.2. The future ; References -- Book references -- Index
Control code
SPR858764156
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xix, 183 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783642382147
Level of compression
unknown
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-642-38215-4
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Reproduction note
Electronic resource.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
Label
Belief-based stability in coalition formation with uncertainty : an intelligent agents' perspective, Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung, (electronic book)
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Chapter 1. Multi-agent cooperation and stability. 1.1. Semi-competitive multi-agent systems ; 1.1.1. Characteristics of multi-agent systems ; 1.1.2. Two basic solution concepts of coalition formations ; 1.1.2.1. Social utility ; 1.1.2.2. Pareto optimality ; 1.1.2.3. Drawbacks of social utility and Pareto optimality ; 1.2. Coalition formation and game theory ; 1.2.1. Transferable utility games ; 1.2.2. Non transferable utility games ; 1.3. Problem with the common knowledge assumption ; References -- Chapter 2. Non-transferable utility games and coalition formation mechanisms. 2.1. Non-transferable utility cooperative games ; 2.2. Transferable utility cooperative games ; 2.3. Coalition formation mechanisms ; 2.4. Belief and uncertainties ; References -- Chapter 3. Two classes of stability--strong core and weak core ; 3.1. Coalition formation and stability ; 3.2. An example ; 3.3. NTU games with internal uncertainty ; 3.4. Opinions and preferences of agents ; 3.5. The strong core and the weak core ; 3.6. Effect of refinedness of agent opinion ; 3.7. Application areas ; 3.8. Summary ; References -- Chapter 4. The b-core: belief-based coalition stability. 4.1. Games without common knowledge ; 4.2. Belief-based coalitional games ; 4.3. NTU games with private beliefs ; 4.4. The core, the b-core and belief accuracy ; 4.6. On dynamic beliefs ; 4.7. Summary ; References -- Chapter 5. Example application of the b-core: buyer coalition problem with beliefs. 5.1. Buyer coalition problems ; 5.1.1. Are the utility really transferable? ; 5.1.2. How about stability? ; 5.1.3. Private information in buyer coalition ; 5.1.4. Existing approaches ; 5.1.5. A new approach ; 5.2. Background of buyer coalition problem ; 5.2.1. Unit price schedule and agent preference ; 5.2.1.1. Two assumptions ; 5.2.1.2. Bids and agents' preferences ; 5.2.2. Agent beliefs ; 5.2.3. NTU buyer coalition games ; 5.2.4. Properties of the b-core in NTU-buyer games ; 5.2.5. On mechanism design ; 5.3. A distributed mechanism ; 5.3.1. Distributed non-transferable utility coalition formation mechanism ; 5.3.2. An example of the mechanism ; 5.4. Experiment ; 5.4.1. Performance of the mechanism ; 5.4.2. Evidence of incentive compatibility ; 5.5. Summary ; References -- Chapter 6. The complete picture: sb-core and wb-core. 6.1. Uncertain opinion and private beliefs ; 6.2. An illustrating example ; 6.3. NTU-BU games ; 6.3.1. Preferences and beliefs in NTU-BU games ; 6.3.2. NTU-BU games stability ; 6.3.2.1. Objections in NTU-BU games ; 6.3.2.2. wb-core and sb-cores ; 6.4. Properties ; 6.4.1. Relationships of the four criteria ; 6.4.2. Effect of refinedness ; 6.4.3. Effect of accuracy ; 6.5. Summary ; References -- Chapter 7. Conclusion. 7.1. New solution concepts for belief-based NTU games ; 7.2. The future ; References -- Book references -- Index
Control code
SPR858764156
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xix, 183 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783642382147
Level of compression
unknown
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-642-38215-4
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Reproduction note
Electronic resource.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote

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