Coverart for item
The Resource Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber

Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber

Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit
Title
Fragile by design
Title remainder
the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit
Statement of responsibility
Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Calomiris, Charles W
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1957-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Haber, Stephen H.
Series statement
The Princeton economic history of the Western world
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Banks and banking
  • Bank failures
  • Credit
Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Contents
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses
Control code
ocn871325937
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xi, 570 p.
Isbn
9780691155241
Isbn Type
(hbk)
Other physical details
illustrations
Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Contents
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses
Control code
ocn871325937
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xi, 570 p.
Isbn
9780691155241
Isbn Type
(hbk)
Other physical details
illustrations

Library Locations

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      Chatham Street, Liverpool, L7 7BD, GB
      53.403069 -2.963723
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