Coverart for item
The Resource Frontiers of dynamic games : game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017, Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich, editors

Frontiers of dynamic games : game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017, Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich, editors

Label
Frontiers of dynamic games : game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017
Title
Frontiers of dynamic games
Title remainder
game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017
Statement of responsibility
Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich, editors
Creator
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Member of
Cataloging source
N$T
Dewey number
519.3
Index
no index present
LC call number
QA269
Literary form
non fiction
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/meetingDate
2017
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/meetingName
International Conference "Game Theory and Management"
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Petrosi︠a︡n, L. A.
  • Mazalov, V. V.
  • Zenkevich, N. A.
Series statement
Static & dynamic game theory: Foundations & Applications,
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
Game theory
Label
Frontiers of dynamic games : game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017, Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich, editors
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Intro; Preface; Contents; Contributors; 1 Countervailing Power with Large and Small Retailers; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Model; 1.3 Equilibrium; 1.4 The Effects of Concentration and Bargaining Power on Retail Prices; 1.5 Conclusion; Appendix; Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Large Retailer qm(Q-m); Derivation of Bargaining Outcome (1.11) and (1.12); References; 2 Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Problem Statement; 2.3 Solution Concepts; 2.3.1 Collusive Solution; 2.3.2 Noncooperative Equilibrium
  • 2.3.3 Bargaining Solution2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 Altruistic, Aggressive and Paradoxical Types of Behavior in a Differential Two-Person Game; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Some Results from the Theory of Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games (NPDG) of Two Persons; 3.3 A Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games with Behavior Types (NPDGwBT): BT-Solution; 3.4 Example; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Learning in a Game of Strategic Experimentation with Three-Armed Exponential Bandits; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Model Setup; 4.3 Complete Learning; 4.4 Equilibrium Payoff Functions
  • 4.4.1 Low Stakes4.4.2 Intermediate Stakes; 4.5 Conclusion; 4.6 Proofs; 4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1; 4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2; 4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3; References; 5 Solution for a System of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations of Special Type and a Link with Nash Equilibrium; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Bilevel Optimal Control Problem; 5.3 The Solution of the System of the Hamilton-Jacobi Equations; 5.4 Design of Nash Equilibrium; 5.5 Example; References; 6 The Impact of Discounted Indices on Equilibrium Strategies of Players in Dynamical Bimatrix Games; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Model Dynamics
  • 6.3 Local Payoff Functions6.4 Nash Equilibrium in the Differential Game with Discounted Functionals; 6.5 Auxiliary Zero-Sum Games; 6.6 Construction of the Dynamical Nash Equilibrium; 6.7 Two-Step Optimal Control Problems; 6.8 The Solution of the Two-Step Optimal Control Problem; 6.9 Guaranteed Values of Discounted Payoffs; 6.10 Equilibrium Trajectories in the Game with Discounted Payoffs; References; 7 On Control Reconstruction Problems for Dynamic Systems Linear in Controls; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Dynamics; 7.3 Input Data; 7.4 Hypotheses; 7.5 Problem Statement
  • 7.6 A Solution of the Inverse Problem7.6.1 Auxiliary Problem; 7.6.2 Necessary Optimality Conditions in the AVP; 7.6.3 A Solution of the Reconstruction Problem; 7.6.4 Convergence of the Solution; 7.7 Remarks on the Suggested Method; 7.8 Example; References; 8 Evolution of Risk-Statuses in One Model of Tax Control; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Static Model of Tax Audit; 8.3 Model with Different Risk-Statuses; 8.4 The Evolutionary Model on the Network; 8.4.1 The Model Based on the Markov Process on the Network; 8.4.2 The Model Based on the Proportional Imitation Rule; 8.5 Numerical Simulations
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource.
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319929873
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • on1045796871
  • (OCoLC)1045796871
Label
Frontiers of dynamic games : game theory and management, St. Petersburg, 2017, Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich, editors
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Intro; Preface; Contents; Contributors; 1 Countervailing Power with Large and Small Retailers; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Model; 1.3 Equilibrium; 1.4 The Effects of Concentration and Bargaining Power on Retail Prices; 1.5 Conclusion; Appendix; Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Large Retailer qm(Q-m); Derivation of Bargaining Outcome (1.11) and (1.12); References; 2 Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Problem Statement; 2.3 Solution Concepts; 2.3.1 Collusive Solution; 2.3.2 Noncooperative Equilibrium
  • 2.3.3 Bargaining Solution2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 Altruistic, Aggressive and Paradoxical Types of Behavior in a Differential Two-Person Game; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Some Results from the Theory of Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games (NPDG) of Two Persons; 3.3 A Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games with Behavior Types (NPDGwBT): BT-Solution; 3.4 Example; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Learning in a Game of Strategic Experimentation with Three-Armed Exponential Bandits; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Model Setup; 4.3 Complete Learning; 4.4 Equilibrium Payoff Functions
  • 4.4.1 Low Stakes4.4.2 Intermediate Stakes; 4.5 Conclusion; 4.6 Proofs; 4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1; 4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2; 4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3; References; 5 Solution for a System of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations of Special Type and a Link with Nash Equilibrium; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Bilevel Optimal Control Problem; 5.3 The Solution of the System of the Hamilton-Jacobi Equations; 5.4 Design of Nash Equilibrium; 5.5 Example; References; 6 The Impact of Discounted Indices on Equilibrium Strategies of Players in Dynamical Bimatrix Games; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Model Dynamics
  • 6.3 Local Payoff Functions6.4 Nash Equilibrium in the Differential Game with Discounted Functionals; 6.5 Auxiliary Zero-Sum Games; 6.6 Construction of the Dynamical Nash Equilibrium; 6.7 Two-Step Optimal Control Problems; 6.8 The Solution of the Two-Step Optimal Control Problem; 6.9 Guaranteed Values of Discounted Payoffs; 6.10 Equilibrium Trajectories in the Game with Discounted Payoffs; References; 7 On Control Reconstruction Problems for Dynamic Systems Linear in Controls; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Dynamics; 7.3 Input Data; 7.4 Hypotheses; 7.5 Problem Statement
  • 7.6 A Solution of the Inverse Problem7.6.1 Auxiliary Problem; 7.6.2 Necessary Optimality Conditions in the AVP; 7.6.3 A Solution of the Reconstruction Problem; 7.6.4 Convergence of the Solution; 7.7 Remarks on the Suggested Method; 7.8 Example; References; 8 Evolution of Risk-Statuses in One Model of Tax Control; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Static Model of Tax Audit; 8.3 Model with Different Risk-Statuses; 8.4 The Evolutionary Model on the Network; 8.4.1 The Model Based on the Markov Process on the Network; 8.4.2 The Model Based on the Proportional Imitation Rule; 8.5 Numerical Simulations
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource.
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319929873
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • on1045796871
  • (OCoLC)1045796871

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