The Resource Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Resource Information
The item Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Liverpool.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Liverpool.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Summary
- Mainstream political economy has recognised only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. This text uses advances in contract theory to build a normative constitutional approach
- Language
- eng
- Extent
- xii, 257 p.
- Note
-
- Series statement appears on jacket
- Based on material used by the author in the 1997 Clarendon lectures
- Contents
-
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1.
- Introduction.
- p. 1
- I.
- Politicians as Informed Supervisors.
- p. 15
- 2.
- Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design.
- p. 17
- 3.
- Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers.
- p. 46
- 4.
- Checks and Balances.
- p. 73
- II.
- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design.
- p. 99
- 5.
- Political Economy and Industrial Policy.
- p. 101
- 6.
- Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy.
- p. 129
- 7.
- Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation.
- p. 154
- III.
- Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design.
- p. 179
- 8.
- Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation.
- p. 181
- 9.
- Collusion and Decentralization.
- p. 207
- 10.
- Concluding Remarks.
- p. 225
- App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French.
- p. 228
- References.
- p. 231
- Index.
- p. 243
- Isbn
- 9780199248681
- Label
- Incentives and political economy
- Title
- Incentives and political economy
- Statement of responsibility
- Jean-Jacques Laffont
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- Mainstream political economy has recognised only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. This text uses advances in contract theory to build a normative constitutional approach
- Cataloging source
- BDS
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
- 1947-2004
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques
- Illustrations
- illustrations
- Index
- index present
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Series statement
- Clarendon lectures in economics
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- Incentives in industry
- Industrial policy
- Subsidies
- Industrial promotion
- Commercial policy
- Economic policy
- Policy sciences
- Label
- Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont
- Note
-
- Series statement appears on jacket
- Based on material used by the author in the 1997 Clarendon lectures
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1.
- Introduction.
- p. 1
- I.
- Politicians as Informed Supervisors.
- p. 15
- 2.
- Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design.
- p. 17
- 3.
- Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers.
- p. 46
- 4.
- Checks and Balances.
- p. 73
- II.
- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design.
- p. 99
- 5.
- Political Economy and Industrial Policy.
- p. 101
- 6.
- Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy.
- p. 129
- 7.
- Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation.
- p. 154
- III.
- Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design.
- p. 179
- 8.
- Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation.
- p. 181
- 9.
- Collusion and Decentralization.
- p. 207
- 10.
- Concluding Remarks.
- p. 225
- App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French.
- p. 228
- References.
- p. 231
- Index.
- p. 243
- Control code
- 070013786447
- Dimensions
- 22 cm.
- Extent
- xii, 257 p.
- Isbn
- 9780199248681
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- n
- Other physical details
- ill.
- Label
- Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont
- Note
-
- Series statement appears on jacket
- Based on material used by the author in the 1997 Clarendon lectures
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1.
- Introduction.
- p. 1
- I.
- Politicians as Informed Supervisors.
- p. 15
- 2.
- Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design.
- p. 17
- 3.
- Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers.
- p. 46
- 4.
- Checks and Balances.
- p. 73
- II.
- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design.
- p. 99
- 5.
- Political Economy and Industrial Policy.
- p. 101
- 6.
- Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy.
- p. 129
- 7.
- Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation.
- p. 154
- III.
- Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design.
- p. 179
- 8.
- Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation.
- p. 181
- 9.
- Collusion and Decentralization.
- p. 207
- 10.
- Concluding Remarks.
- p. 225
- App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French.
- p. 228
- References.
- p. 231
- Index.
- p. 243
- Control code
- 070013786447
- Dimensions
- 22 cm.
- Extent
- xii, 257 p.
- Isbn
- 9780199248681
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- n
- Other physical details
- ill.
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.liverpool.ac.uk/portal/Incentives-and-political-economy-Jean-Jacques/MJuZACONjhc/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.liverpool.ac.uk/portal/Incentives-and-political-economy-Jean-Jacques/MJuZACONjhc/">Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.liverpool.ac.uk/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.liverpool.ac.uk/">University of Liverpool</a></span></span></span></span></div>
