Coverart for item
The Resource Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker

Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker

Label
Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Title
Learning to eat soup with a knife
Title remainder
counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Statement of responsibility
John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker
Title variation
Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl?a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq?considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl?the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass?argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1966-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Nagl, John A.
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Malaya
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Great Britain
  • United States
Label
Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Originally published: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [227]-243) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
pt. 1. Setting the stage. How armies learn -- The hard lesson of insurgency -- The British and American armies: separated by a common language -- pt. 2. Malaya. British army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan emergency, 1948-1951 -- The empire strikes back: British army counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 -- pt. 3. Vietnam. The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the advisory years, 1950-1964 -- The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the fighting years, 1965-1972 -- pt. 4. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Hard lessons: the British and American armies learn counterinsurgency -- Organizational culture and learning institutions: learning to eat soup with a knife
Control code
ocm58595108
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xxix, 249 p.
Isbn
9780226567709
Lccn
2005008015
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Label
Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker
Publication
Note
Originally published: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [227]-243) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
pt. 1. Setting the stage. How armies learn -- The hard lesson of insurgency -- The British and American armies: separated by a common language -- pt. 2. Malaya. British army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan emergency, 1948-1951 -- The empire strikes back: British army counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 -- pt. 3. Vietnam. The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the advisory years, 1950-1964 -- The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the fighting years, 1965-1972 -- pt. 4. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Hard lessons: the British and American armies learn counterinsurgency -- Organizational culture and learning institutions: learning to eat soup with a knife
Control code
ocm58595108
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xxix, 249 p.
Isbn
9780226567709
Lccn
2005008015
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n

Library Locations

    • Sydney Jones LibraryBorrow it
      Chatham Street, Liverpool, L7 7BD, GB
      53.403069 -2.963723
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