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The Resource Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate, Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate, Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Label
Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
Title
Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
Statement of responsibility
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice
Member of
Cataloging source
YDX
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Felsenthal, Dan S
Dewey number
324.6/5
Index
no index present
LC call number
JF1001
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Nurmi, Hannu
Series statement
SpringerBriefs in economics
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
Voting
Label
Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate, Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 1 Non-monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview; Abstract; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure; 1.3 The Plan of the Book; References; 2 Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed; Abstract; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Five Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates; 2.2.1 Plurality with Runoff (P-R); 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (AV; aka Instant Runoff Voting; Ranked Choice Voting); 2.2.3 The Coombs Method (Cf. Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399; Straffin 1980; Coombs et al. 1984)
  • 2.2.4 The Dodgson Method (Cf. Black 1958, pp. 222-234 McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 288-297); 2.2.5 The Nanson Method (Cf. Nanson 1883; McLean and Urken 1995, Chap. 14); 2.3 Eight Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates; 2.3.1 Successive Elimination (Cf. Farquharson 1969); 2.3.2 Bucklin's Method (Cf. Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491; Tideman 2006, p. 203); 2.3.3 Majority Judgment (Cf. Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2010); 2.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951); 2.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66); 2.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959
  • Kemeny and Snell 1960 Young and Levenglick 1978; Young 1988, 1995); 2.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986); 2.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977); 2.4 Five Main Procedures that Are not Susceptible to Any Monotonicity Failure; 2.4.1 Plurality (or First Past the Post) Voting Procedure; 2.4.2 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983); 2.4.3 Borda's Count (Cf. de Borda 1784; Black 1958; McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 83-89); 2.4.4 Range Voting (Smith 2000); 2.4.5 The Minmax Procedure; References; 3 Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules; Abstract
  • 3.1 Smith's (1973) Theorem3.2 Fishburn's (1982) Theorems; 3.3 Moulin's (1988) and Pérez's (2001) Theorems; 3.4 Saari's (1989) Results; 3.5 Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) Theorem; References; 4 Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates; Abstract; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure of the Plurality with Runoff Method Under Fixed Electorates; 4.2.1 An Initial Situation with a Condorcet Winner; 4.2.1.1 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [UB]
  • 4.2.1.2 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [UW]4.2.1.3 Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [DB]; 4.2.1.4 Impossibility: Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [DW]; 4.2.2 An Initial Situation with a Top Cycle; 4.2.2.1 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [UB]; 4.2.2.2 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [UW]; 4.2.2.3 Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [DB]; 4.3 Types of Monotonicity Failure of the Alternative Vote Method Under Fixed Electorates
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (viii, 88 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319510606
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
ocn972455468
Label
Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate, Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 1 Non-monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview; Abstract; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure; 1.3 The Plan of the Book; References; 2 Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed; Abstract; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Five Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates; 2.2.1 Plurality with Runoff (P-R); 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (AV; aka Instant Runoff Voting; Ranked Choice Voting); 2.2.3 The Coombs Method (Cf. Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399; Straffin 1980; Coombs et al. 1984)
  • 2.2.4 The Dodgson Method (Cf. Black 1958, pp. 222-234 McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 288-297); 2.2.5 The Nanson Method (Cf. Nanson 1883; McLean and Urken 1995, Chap. 14); 2.3 Eight Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates; 2.3.1 Successive Elimination (Cf. Farquharson 1969); 2.3.2 Bucklin's Method (Cf. Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491; Tideman 2006, p. 203); 2.3.3 Majority Judgment (Cf. Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2010); 2.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951); 2.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66); 2.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959
  • Kemeny and Snell 1960 Young and Levenglick 1978; Young 1988, 1995); 2.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986); 2.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977); 2.4 Five Main Procedures that Are not Susceptible to Any Monotonicity Failure; 2.4.1 Plurality (or First Past the Post) Voting Procedure; 2.4.2 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983); 2.4.3 Borda's Count (Cf. de Borda 1784; Black 1958; McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 83-89); 2.4.4 Range Voting (Smith 2000); 2.4.5 The Minmax Procedure; References; 3 Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules; Abstract
  • 3.1 Smith's (1973) Theorem3.2 Fishburn's (1982) Theorems; 3.3 Moulin's (1988) and Pérez's (2001) Theorems; 3.4 Saari's (1989) Results; 3.5 Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) Theorem; References; 4 Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates; Abstract; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure of the Plurality with Runoff Method Under Fixed Electorates; 4.2.1 An Initial Situation with a Condorcet Winner; 4.2.1.1 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [UB]
  • 4.2.1.2 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [UW]4.2.1.3 Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [DB]; 4.2.1.4 Impossibility: Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [DW]; 4.2.2 An Initial Situation with a Top Cycle; 4.2.2.1 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [UB]; 4.2.2.2 Upward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Worse Off [UW]; 4.2.2.3 Downward Monotonicity Failure-Dynamic Voters Better Off [DB]; 4.3 Types of Monotonicity Failure of the Alternative Vote Method Under Fixed Electorates
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (viii, 88 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319510606
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
ocn972455468

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