Coverart for item
The Resource Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy, George Norman, (electronic book)

Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy, George Norman, (electronic book)

Label
Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy
Title
Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy
Statement of responsibility
George Norman
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Competition policy aims to prevent anticompetitive agreements and mergers, limiting the abusive exercise of market power. The formulation and application of this policy presents significant challenges, which include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements. For this insightful volume the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations. This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject
Member of
Cataloging source
UKM
Dewey number
338.6048
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
no index present
LC call number
HD41
LC item number
.R38 2008
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1946-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Norman, George
Series statement
  • The international library of critical writings in economics
  • An Elgar reference collection
Series volume
217
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Monopolies
  • Competition
Label
Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy, George Norman, (electronic book)
Instantiates
Publication
Note
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Contents
  • Recommended readings (Machine generated): Jonathan B. Baker (2003), 'The Case for Antitrust Enforcement', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (4), Fall, 27-50 -- John Vickers (2005), 'Abuse of Market Power', Economic Journal, 115, June, F244-F261 -- Barbara McCutcheon (1997), 'Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (2), April, 330-50 -- David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (2001), 'Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 379-98 -- Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), 'Optimal Collusion with Private Information', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 428-65 -- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), 'Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority', International Economic Review, 46 (1), February, 145-69 -- Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), 'Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 263-88 -- John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), 'The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction "Knockouts"', Antitrust Bulletin, xLII (2), Summer, 503-16 -- John M. Connor (2001), '"Our Customers Are Our Enemies": The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 5-21 -- Lawrence J. White (2001), 'Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 23-31 -- George Symeonidis (2002), 'Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (3), March, 339-52 -- Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), 'What Determines Cartel Success?', Journal of Economic Literature, xLIv (1), March, 43-95 -- Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), 'Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (3), March, 347-79 -- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), 'Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 107-26 -- David Spector (2003), 'Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (10), December, 1591-600 -- Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), 'Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples ', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 13 (2), July, 265-79 -- Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), 'Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits', American Economic Review, 93 (4), September, 1152-72 -- Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 127-42 -- Yongmin Chen (2001), 'On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (4), Winter, 667-85
  • Margaret E. Slade (1998), 'Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?', Economic Journal, 108 (448), May, 565-602 -- B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), 'Exclusive Dealing', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64-103 -- Michael D. Whinston (2001), 'Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), Spring, 63-80 -- Tim R. Sass (2005), 'The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4), April, 203-25 -- Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), 'Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory', Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 2475-94 -- Barry Nalebuff (2004), 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1), February, 159-87 -- Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), 'The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries', RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2), Summer, 194-220 -- Leemore S. Dafny (2005), 'Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14 (3), Fall, 513-42
Control code
eep9781785366826
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxii, 662 p.)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781785366826
Other physical details
ill.
Specific material designation
remote
Label
Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy, George Norman, (electronic book)
Publication
Note
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Contents
  • Recommended readings (Machine generated): Jonathan B. Baker (2003), 'The Case for Antitrust Enforcement', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (4), Fall, 27-50 -- John Vickers (2005), 'Abuse of Market Power', Economic Journal, 115, June, F244-F261 -- Barbara McCutcheon (1997), 'Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (2), April, 330-50 -- David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (2001), 'Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 379-98 -- Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), 'Optimal Collusion with Private Information', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 428-65 -- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), 'Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority', International Economic Review, 46 (1), February, 145-69 -- Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), 'Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 263-88 -- John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), 'The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction "Knockouts"', Antitrust Bulletin, xLII (2), Summer, 503-16 -- John M. Connor (2001), '"Our Customers Are Our Enemies": The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 5-21 -- Lawrence J. White (2001), 'Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 23-31 -- George Symeonidis (2002), 'Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (3), March, 339-52 -- Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), 'What Determines Cartel Success?', Journal of Economic Literature, xLIv (1), March, 43-95 -- Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), 'Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (3), March, 347-79 -- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), 'Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 107-26 -- David Spector (2003), 'Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (10), December, 1591-600 -- Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), 'Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples ', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 13 (2), July, 265-79 -- Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), 'Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits', American Economic Review, 93 (4), September, 1152-72 -- Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 127-42 -- Yongmin Chen (2001), 'On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (4), Winter, 667-85
  • Margaret E. Slade (1998), 'Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?', Economic Journal, 108 (448), May, 565-602 -- B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), 'Exclusive Dealing', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64-103 -- Michael D. Whinston (2001), 'Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), Spring, 63-80 -- Tim R. Sass (2005), 'The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4), April, 203-25 -- Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), 'Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory', Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 2475-94 -- Barry Nalebuff (2004), 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1), February, 159-87 -- Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), 'The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries', RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2), Summer, 194-220 -- Leemore S. Dafny (2005), 'Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14 (3), Fall, 513-42
Control code
eep9781785366826
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxii, 662 p.)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781785366826
Other physical details
ill.
Specific material designation
remote

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