How autocrats compete : parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa

The Resource How autocrats compete : parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa
Label
How autocrats compete : parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa
Title remainder
parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa
Statement of responsibility
Yonatan L. Morse
Creator
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Most autocrats now hold unfair elections, yet how they compete in them and manipulate them differs greatly. How Autocrats Compete advances a theory that explains variation in electoral authoritarian competition. Using case studies of Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya, along with broader comparisons from Africa, it finds that the kind of relationships autocrats foster with supporters and external actors matters greatly during elections. When autocrats can depend on credible ruling parties that provide elites with a level playing field and commit to wider constituencies, they are more certain in their own support and can compete in elections with less manipulation. Shelter from international pressure further helps autocrats deploy a wider range of coercive tools when necessary. Combining in-depth field research, within-case statistics, and cross-regional comparisons, Morse fills a gap in the literature by focusing on important variation in authoritarian institution building and international patronage. Understanding how autocrats compete sheds light on the comparative resilience and durability of modern authoritarianism
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
Dewey number
324.96
Index
index present
LC call number
JQ1879.A5
LC item number
M67 2019
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries

Context

Context of How autocrats compete : parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa

Work of

Structured data from the Bibframe namespace is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License by Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool. Additional terms may apply to data associated with third party namespaces.